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13 1.  Political context 
1 Countries of South-Eastern Europe have,  for the  last' decade,. enjoyed a  great dear  of support from the 
international  community. in  general  and. the ·European  Union  in  particular.  Despite  this,  they  have 
continued to suffeOrom inter-ethnic tensions and conflict.  There has been a lack cif substantial political or  .• 
economic development. Despite major efforts to stabilise individual countries and the region as  a whole, 
. the progress made has been fragile.  This is clear from the degree to which it has_been jeopardised by the . 
current conflict in Kosovo.  The region is now at a turning point.  A new approach to  peace and stability in 
the wider region,  involving both the countries of the  wider region  and  the  European  Union,  is  urgently 
needed.  At this time of tremendous upheaval and uncertainty in the region, the EU has a responsibility to 
contribute  to  the  resolution  both. of the  immediate  instability  and,  in  the  longer  term,  to  the  general 
. stabilisation and development of the region.  This  responsibility has been recognised,  most recently,  by 
-the  European Council on  14 April, and  by the General Affairs Councils on  8 and 26  April,  and  27  May 
1999.  Fulfilling  this  respC?nsibility · wjll  necessitate  decisions  on  considerable  amounts  of  further 
assistance, as well as on appropriate implementation mechanisms and legal bases. 
The European Union faces an ever greater challenge.  It needs to play an important proactive role  in  the 
region.  It  is  presently  responding·  to  this  challenge  through  the  development  of its  existing· Regional 
Approach to the countries of South-Eastern. Europe  .. The further development of this Regional Approach 
into a  Stabilisation and Association  pr:ocess,  which. will  at a  later stage  become  part .of  the. future  Eu-
Common  Strategy,  will  be  central  for  the  EU's  political  visibility  and  wilf also  constitute  an  important 
element of the Stability Pact for South-::Eastern  Europe which was approved by the Council on  17  May. 
The Stability Pact will provide a framework, wider than the -EU,  in which all can contribute to lasting peace 
and stability, democracy and economic prosperity, in the region.  It will help the process of integration into. 
Euro-Atlantic_ structures.  -
The  proposals  in  the  present  Communication  for  the  development  of a  Stabilisation  and  Association 
process will also help the development of the EU Common Strategy towards the Western Balkans. which 
will  constitute the framework for EU  relations with  the region  in  the coming years and will  be  the  longer 
term perspective within which the prospects for proposed :closer relations with the countries of the region 
should be seen.  As at two other key stC!ges  in recent history - the emergence of independent states in 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  in  1989-90and  the  dissolution  of the  former Soviet  Union  in·  1991  - the 
European Union is confronted with geopolitical challenges requiring the development of new policies, and 
instruments, towards a group of countries.  On this occasion, it must respond by offering a  per~pective of 
integration; based on a progressive approach adapted to the situation of the specific countries.  l 
The European Union has a  particular int~rest in the region, because of its geographic proximity to Meli1ber 
States and candidate countries.  This interest will be even higher following the future enlargem.ents of the 
European Union, which will bring these countries even closer to the our borders. Stabilization of the region 
would bring real benefits both to the region and to_ the EU.  Instability is very costly for all concerned.  The. 
EU  has spent enormous .sums on  repairing  the  results  of instability·.- over 7bnll since  1991  (details  at 
Annex I)  without  counting  the  cost  of refugees  within  EU  Member States  or  of other· operations  (UN, 
OSCE, NATO  ...  ) -_a  bill which is. continuing to rise in the present circumstances.  It is clearly more in the 
interest of the countries of the region, and of the European Union to which they will ultimately belong, that 
even a fraction of these surns should be spent' instead on their political and· economic development. 
The  present conflict in  Kosovo  has  shown  the  potential  political  effects  of instability  on  neighbouring 
states,  with  the  risk  of  destabilisation  of  the ·former  Yugoslav  Republic  of Macedonia,  Albania  and 
Montenegro.  It has .also had economic effects on countries cif the region, such a;; Romania and Buigaria. 
Those  countries  are  already  on ·track  to  EU  membership,  and  this  process  will  not  be  affected  by 
developments in  this region.  It  r~veals, once again,  the inextricably regional nature of problems in  this 
zone, and reinforces the need for a regional approach to the problems.  Ttie countries of the wider region .. 
both  candidates· and  EU · !Vfember, States,' have  a  particular  contribution  to  make  as  examples  of the 
progress that can be made (e.g.  in democratisation, multi-ethnicity, reform) and in the building of practical 
interdependence.  · 
! : .. 
'.·! 
i. 
2.  The existing E.U Regional .Approach 
Tt'Je  changed wider political context necessitates a development of existing policy. But, even without it, it 
would be appropriate, three years after the elaboration of the Regional Approach, to make proposals for its  · 
further· develop'men't.  Recent events, ·and  the  accelerated  pace  o-r  the  Clevelopment  of other related 
strategies,  mean that the enhancement of the  Regional  Approach  should  be  more ambitious.  It should 
~espond·  to the  challenges posed  by the changed  s!tuation on the  ground and the new political  context. 
The  Commission's. proposals,  in~s~ction 3 below,  are  tt'l'erefore  more than  routine  "conclusions" on  the 
developments in the Regional Approach countries, but also respond to the changed nature of the  sitt.Jation 
and the ct1allenges faced.  ·  · 
The Regional Approach provides a framework for the development of relations  ~ith 'five  ~ountries  of the 
· region  - Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Croatia,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Yugoslavia,  the  former  Yugoslav 
Republic of Ma~edonia, and Albania - with  which  the  EC  had  not,.  in  1996,  adopted  direCtives  for  the 
negotiation .of association.  agreements.  These  fiv~  states  were,  and  remain:  differentiated  into ·two 
groups.  The former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia and Albania, which were not involved -in  the 1991-95 
war and had more .advanced bilateral relations with the EC, on the one hand, and the other three countries 
· which are party to the Dayton I' Paris .peace agreements, .compliance with which is· an important factor in 
·regional stability as well as relations with the EU, on the other.  ·  · ·  · 
The primary objeCtives of the 'Regional Approach, as estaQiished in  1996, were to underpin the successful 
implementation of the-Dayton I Paris and  Erdut peace agreements and the creation of an  area of political 
_stability and economic prosperity by:  · 
a)  ~  promoting and  sustaining democracy and  the  rule- of law  (institution-building, reform of the  state  . 
and public administration, recbnstitution of civil society) and respect forhuman  and;_mi~or!!i:__~}fl!!.~~ 
/  . 
. (notably  non-discrimination  between  citizens;  and  including  the  resettlement. of  refugees  and 
· · displaceg persons); and 
relaunching  economic  activity  (rebuilding  the  economy,  restoring  and  improving. infrastructure .. 
reorienting former war economi~s to civilian activities, and former command economies to. market · 
reforms).  ·  ·  .  . 
.  ' 
The RegionaL Approach is based; in particular, on political and economic conditionality. established by  the 
·General Affairs Council on 29 April  1997,_compliance with which
1 forms the  basis for the  develop111ent  of 
bilateral relations with the EC in the field oftrade (eligibility for autonomous trade preferences\ financial 
and  economic  assistan·ce  (under  the  OBNOVA  r  Reconstruction'  and  ~P~ARE
4  programmes")  and, 
contractual relations
6
-:  · 
At six-monthly interVals since 1997, !he Commission has prepared reports on compliance, on the b·asis of ~hich'the Cotmcil 
has adopted Conclusions.  ·, 
"The autonomous trade preference  regime,  commonly  referred  to  as  the  autonomous _trade  measures  (ATMs)  is  found  in 
Regulation  70/97 of 20:12:96  OJ  l  16  of 18.1.97, last amended  by  Regulation  2863/98 of 30.12:98  OJ  L  :~58 31.12.98.' 
Albania is  not covered by  this instrument as its origin is the  former EC-SFRY Cooperation Agreement.  donouncod in  1  ml 1 
when  the  SFRY ceased to exist.  Wine imports from the  former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ai1d  from  Slovenia ;;ue  still 
·covered by the regime since bilateral Wine Agreements have not yet been co-ncluded with the EC.  · 
3  ~egulation 1628/96 of ... , as last·amended by Regulation 851/98 of  ... 
5 
Regulation (EEC) No'.  3906/89, as  amended by Regulation  3800/91  of 23.12.91  to  include Albania,  Regulation  1366/95 of 
12.06.95 to  include  Croatia,  Regulation  463/96- of 11.03.96  to  include  the  former Yugoslav -Republic  of  Macedonia, ·and 
Regulation 753/96 of .22.04.96 to  include Bosnia and  Herzegovina..  In line with  the  Council  Conclusions of 29 April  1997 .. 
·  PHARE  assistance  to  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  is  "limited  to  projects  in  direct  support  o'l  the  peace  agreements,  \n 
particular the building of cross-entity links and  refugee  return''.  Croatia has been  ~-usp·ended from PHARE  since  August 
. 1995 
and PHARE-fui')ded projects such as CAFAO, CAM-A and CAM-ES .  . 
Cooperation  Agreement with  Albania,  in  force  since  1992;  Cooperation  Agreement  witt1  the  former Yugoslav  Ropuhlic of 
Macedonia, in force since 1998; Transport Agreement with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in forco since 1997.  .  2  . 
I. 
;  ..... · It was, and remains, clear that most of these objectives cannot be achieved on a purely national basis -
most of ~he countries  of the  region  not only  share  the  same aspirations  for  closer  relations  with  the.· 
European Union, but they also face many of the same problems, and their economies are linked in various 
degrees of interdependence. The countries themselves and the European· Union must therefore put more 
emphasis on cooperation, both bilateral, multilateral .and  regional.  Assistance to them must also have a 
regional perspective, encouraging and requiring the countries concerned to work together, ·as well as with 
their neighbours in the wider region and with the EU,  to further their economic development.· In  particular, 
the multil?teral dimension of the existing approach must be enhanced, to avoid the risks of concentrating 
solely on a policy of selective bilateralism to the detriment of a truly regional strategy. 
3.  Further development of the Regional Approach 
Developments· both within and outside the. region mean that there is  a need to  react in  the  short-term to 
the changing situation in the region  Such developments also require more long-term strategies aimed at 
· the long-term stabilization of the  countries of the Regional Approach  and  thus  also of the  wider region. 
Such  a  strategy would  also· underline  that  afl  countries .  in  the  region  have  the  prospect  of increasing 
rapprochement with the EU, in the perspective of full integration into European structures. 
In view of the need to define a new approach to the changed general circumstances, and to overcome the 
· failure of the countries to adequately respond  to  the  incentives already offered  (notably as  regards  the 
need to cooperate on a bilateral, multilateral or regional level), the C.ommission proposes a new, enhanced 
approach.  This would entail the development of a Stabilisation and Association process, which would  in 
effect offer higher incentives than before to the countries concerned.  These stronger incentives would, of 
course,  require  compliance  with  more  demanding  conditions,  both  political  and  economic  as  well  as 
increased emphasis on the need for regional cooperation. 
· The Commission therefore proposes the following  content for the  Stabilisation and  Association process, 
combif!ing both the development of existing instruments, and new initiatives aimed at an improvement of_ 
the situation:  ;  ·  -
•  The development ·of Stabilisation and Association Agreements, a new kind of contractual relations, 
taking .into account the individual situation of each ·country, with a perspective of EU  membership 
on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty and ol')ce the Copenhagen criteria have been met 
i•  The c;:levelopment of existing economic and trade relations with and within the region 
·•  The development I partial  r~orieritation of existing economic & financial assistance 
•  Increased assistance for democratization, civil society, education and institution-building 
•  The use of new opportunities· for cooper:ation  in  various fields,  including justice & . h(jme affairs (in 
particular following the entry into fore~ of the Amsterdam Treaty) 
•  The development of political dialogue, including at regional level 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements 
At present,  there  are contractual  relations,· in  the  form  of Cooperation  Agreements  with  two of  the  five 
· countries  - the  former Yugoslav  Republic  of Macedonia  and  Albania.  The  start of negotiations  for 
contractual relations with the other states (usually interpreted as meaning  Cooperation Agreements in  a 
first stage), unde"r the Regional Approach, depended on compliance with both general and specific politicar 
· and ec:;onomic conditions6•  .  ,  .  ·  ·  ·  ·  . 
Closer relations  with  the  EU  constitute  a  very  important political  and .economic incentive  for all  of the 
countries.  The perspective of contractual relations should be progressive in nature. and should be seen as 
complementary to otherstabilization efforts in  the  political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian and even 
7 
ll 
Wording from Art. 7 of the Common Position· adopted by the Council on the basis of  Article 15 of the TE  U concerning the 
launching of the Stability Pact of the EU on South-Eastern Europe 
cf.  Conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 29 Apri11997 
.  3 .  . 
• 
military fields.  They should tl)erefore be developed in order to fulfil their potential as an important political 
and economic incentive for stabilization and democratization within the region, on an  individual basis, and 
within the framework of the Regional Approach
9
.  ·  · 
'  ' 
The European Union has been confronted with geopolitical challenges requiring the  dev~lopmen~ of new 
instruments governing its bilateral relations with a group ·of countries_on two oth~r recent occasions.  They 
were  the  emerger:~ce  ·of independent  states  in:·  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  in .1989-90  and  with  the . 
_  dissolution  of the  former Soviet' Union  in -1991.  o·n  those  occasions,  it developed the· concept  of sui-
generis categories of contractual relations - for the  countries of Central and  Eastern Europe, 'it developed 
the  "Europe Agreements"  (based ·on  Article  238
10
,  containing  a specific  reference  to  the  perspective  of 
accession) and, for the countries of the former .Soviet Union, the concept ·of "Partnership and Cooperation  , 
Agr~ements"
11 
:·  (  '  · 
To  respond to  the  present,  changed,  circumstances  in  the  region,  as  well  as  the  Conclusions  of the 
General Affairs Council of 26 April  1999 and the proposed wording of  the Stability Pact, the Commission 
therefore  considers  it  appropriate  that  a  new  Stabilisation  and  Association  process  should  be 
launched,  an  element  of which  would be  a  new  cat~gory of agreement  - Stabilisation  and 
Ass.ociation ·  Agr~ements - for  which  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  CrC?atia,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania wo~ld,- in principle, be eligible .. 
These  Agreements. would  be  tailor-made,  differentiated  to  take  accot,Jnt  of the  specific  situatipn  of the 
country concerned .. The main objectives would be:  .  . 
o  To draw the region closer to the perspective of full integration into EU structures. 
o  To support t!'le consolidation of democracy, rule of law, ~conomic  development and reform, 
adequate administrative structures, and regional cooperation,  ·  · 
•  To. establish a formalized framework for political dialogue; both a_t  bilateral. and regional level. 
'  '•  I 
•  To promote. economic relations, trade, investment, enterprise policy, transport and development. and  --
cooperation in  ,the customs area
7
, with the-perspective of closer integration into the world trading 
system, including the possibility of establishing a-free trade area or areas, when sufficient progress'  · ·>-
has been made it;· economic ·reform,  .  · 
•·  To provide a basis fc;>r cooperation in.the field-of justice and home affairs, 
o  To provide a basis-for economic, social, civil, educational, scientific, technological, energy,. 
.  ..  .environmental and cultural cooperation (including a plc:Jn to safeguard the' cultural heritage of these 
·-:  -..  regions), _underpinned by "association-orientated" assistance programmes which would also be· · 
.  designed to, facilitate approximation of legislation in accordance with relevant Ee acquis:· 
These  S~~biiisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) would bring a  ne~  dlmenslon"to relations  with .. 
. the regiqn, replaci!lgJhe prospect of a Cooperation Agreement for those countries which had  not already 
.  reached. that stage;  and,  for cthose  that already :have  a  Cooper~tioh Agreei:J.1ent,  providing  a new.  more 
·  ·.  advanced relationship  . 
. Jhe condltions:{o.r the:;_stalt of negotiations-~n suchAgreements  would~remain those  set out-in  th:e_  . 
Council Conclusions of29April ·1997 on tl:le opening of negotiations for c;:ontractual relations.  Obviously,. 
to-conclude such an enhanced relationship with _tlie-EU,  a country  would .also tia\ie -to  have attained · 
jhe high levf:!l of political.and economic .development required to· meetthe in~reased  reciprocal and mutual 
obligations· of the  relevant  a~uis.  . In  addition,  taking  into ·account' the  context of the  Stabilisation  and 
.  '  ' .  ~  .  .  ·.  .  ' 
9  Wording·from Para 21  of the draft Stability ·Pact for SouthEastern Europe, as approved by. Co~ncil.on 17 May' 
10  Now article 310 of the TEU  .  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
:
1 
·  based for example, in the case of Moldova, on Articles 44(2). 47(2) last sentence, 55, 57c(2), 71, 80(2), 93, 94, 133, and 
· 308 of the TEU  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  .. 
4 Association process, the Stability ·Pact  and  the  future  EU  Common  Strategy,  there would. be  increased 
emphasis on progress in developing regional cooperation.  / 
As regards the possible s~21rt o~  negotiatiOB1l$ witlhl tlhle  ilnHdlavadhLll2l~  COV!f111~Q"ie$for Stability and Association 
Agreements,  more detail~ are provided  in  section 4 infra,. in  the conclusions on  the  individua)  countries.; 
The  Commission will  report first on the feasibility of the  opening  of such  negotiations in  the  case  of the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and then on the case of Albania. In the light of recommendations 
made  by  the  Commission  in  its  reports  on  the  feasibility  of  the  opening  of  negotiations  for  sucll. 
Agre~ments, appropriate negotiating directives might be developed.  Given its positive record to date, and 
its compliance with the relevant conditions, it is  likely that negotiations will first be opened with  the former 
Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia.  It ·would  n,ot  yet  be  appropriate  to  consider  the  opening  or 
negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina or Croatia as the relevant conditions have not yet been fulfilled. 
But the Commission could  prepare technical reports on· the  feasibility of the  opening of such negotiations· · · 
at a  later stage.  The  Federal  Republic· of Yugoslavia  has the  same  general  perspectives  as  the  other 
states once it respects the .relevant conditions.  At present, it_ disregards the most fundamental of these. 
Democratization,, Civil Society and institutiona~:nllilding · 
Efforts :to promote economic development, as described below, will be greatly facilitated by the stability of 
the  underlying  political  structures,  the  maintenance  of  the  rule. of  law,  the  effectivenes·s  of  public 
administratiOI}.  and  the  viability  of civil  society.  EU  action has  bee'n,  and  r~mains, directed  at  the~e 
objectives.  It  includes  such  elements  as  support  for  free  and  fair  elections  and  good  parliamantaty 
practice;  legi~!ative  retorm  and  voter  education;  independent _media;  rule  of  law  through  technical 
assistance for judicial , police and customs reform;  civic education; anti-corruption programmes (dmwing 
on experiences .in.. the  customs field  in  Albania  and  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina),  training (including· higher 
education) and development for over-stretched and  under-resourced public administrations. (which will  in 
turn contribute to stabilization, development and the effective implementation of assistance programmes); 
and support for civil society organizations and  initiatives .. Particular emphasis will  be given,  through civil 
society  organisations, .  to  the  post-conflict  rebuilding  of  consensus,  to  conflict-resolution  and  to  the  ' 
lightening of the psychological burden consequent to war.  It could be appropriate to take into account the 
regional dimension in c_hannelling financial resources to lqcal community-based organisations while at. the 
same time pursuing common overail objectives for the development of democracy in the regi_on. 
Justice.and Home Affairs 
Initiatives in  the field of justice and horne affairs could  be  considered -.not only  .. as a part- of Stabilisation 
and Association Agreements, as mentioned above·,  but more generally.·  Assistance-could be provided, by 
. both  the  .  Community . and  Member .  States,  for  ·  institutiofl-building  .  increasin~  the  efficiency  of  law 
enforcem~nt,  · border controls,  the  fight against  or~.Janised crime  and  corruption 
1 
,  including  by  means  of 
"twinning".  .  Co~ordinated  support  could  also  be  provided  in  the  context  of  migration  through  the 
development of  relevant legal instruments, particularly in the area of readm.ission.  · · 
Trade 
The  existing.  sys~~m. of. autonomous  trade  preferences  for  the. countries  which.  em~rged from  former 
Yugoslavia  (for  which .  only  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  Croatia  are  presently  eligible)  will  remain 
important unW contractual relations are established with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. In future, the Comrl)ission intends, to split the existing system of autonomous trade 
preferenC!=S into separate trade preferences for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in order to ensure a 
12  within the f~amework  of a Community Customs Assistance  Missi~n. in the light of  th~ achievements of CAFAO in Bosnia and 
Herz~govina and CAM-A in Albania  · 
5 
·'  ·I t  . 
I 
i. 
I  . 
transparent and equitable share of these preferences 
13  betWeen these countries, and'to pr~pare possible 
future negotiations for. an agreement.  In  accordance with the Council Conclusions of Q! Noyember 1998_, 
and in anticipation of a "Stabilisation and Association Agreement"_,  the Commission will present, in the near 
future, a formal proposal for the upgrading of the bilateral trade regime with Albania towards a preferential 
regime similar to w~at  is  afforded to other countries of the region
4
.  ·  - .  • 
The  upgrading· of  relations  by  means  of a  Stabilisation  and ·Association 
implications as regards the reciprocal obligations which would  be  involved. 
·_countries will be strengthened by their accession to the WTO. 
·Economic· and Financial Assistance 
Agreement  will  have  trade 
Trade relations with these 
.  . 
Economic and political  development should go hand  in  hand.  Within the countries of the  region.· sqund 
macro-economies will  need strong and democratically based  institutions; and balanced prosperity will  in 
turn  reinforce .fheir political  systems.  · The removal  of economic  bar~iers betwe!en  the  countries  of tre 
region will enable· closer political  relationships to take_ root.  The Commission,  iri  close cooperation with_ 
international  finanCial  institutions  {IFis),  will  co-ntinue· to  monitor macro-economic  developments  ;:!nd 
deepen  its  macro;.economic  dialogue  with  these  countries.  Financial  assistance  will  be  focussed  on 
helping to build strong, stable market-based economies that are well  integ~ated with their neighbours and  - · 
with the  European and global-economies.  In  view of ·the needs ·of transition and  reconstruction  and of. 
increasing  infrast~ucture linkages, considerable investment. will  be  needed.  Attention must therefore be 
given to creating the right climate for private investment flows, in order to fill the gap between public sector - · 
capacity and funding.  - -
, .fn 1999, financial .assistance from the ·Community budget to the countries of the Regional Apprbacl:l will be 
almost 700mL((see Annex 1).  A considerable amount of further assistance will no doubt be required, to 
underpin the EU contribution to the implementation .of the Stability Pact and  ,thE?  EU Common Strategy, as 
well  as  for  the  impact of the  Kosovo  crisis  and  the  eventual  cost  of reconstruction:  The  Buqgetary 
Authority will be required, in  due course, to take- the necessary decisions, on. the basis of proposals from 
the Commission.  The EU  cannot commit itself .to  the implementation of ambitious programmes without. 
however,  also· having  the  necessary mechan-isms  and  means in  place  to  enable  the  flexible,  well. cO- .  · 
ordinated,  and  efficient  use  of  all  Community  assistance  instruments  in  a  manner  adapted  to  the 
circumstances  ..  _,  The.  Gommission will  propose a legal base for the  implementation of assistance to' the 
region as a whole, taking into a_9count the articulation with the PHARE programme, and is examin!ng the 
. question  of-appropriate implementation mechanisms I structures, ·including for the :channelling of aid from 
other donors.  Legal bases  ~auld be created I modified to. facilitate the lmplementation· of all Community  , 
financial assistance programmes for reconstruction (including of environmental damage) and regional co- . 
operation (the cross  border I· regional use of some- of which eis presently ·not feasiple due to the fact that not·n·., ··.  ; 
all potential partners are-eligible for the underlying PHARE programme).  ..  - · 
The EU is  itsl;llf:~ model for-overcoming conflict and promoting reconciliation through  clo~~ co-operation to·· 
·-achieve cornmon goals, while  re:specting  national·.sovereignty and territorial  integrity.  States-aspiring to·  · 
closer relations  with  the  EU  should  behave  in  a  similar manner,  and  EC 'financial· assistance and  the- ·· 
.·development-of bilateral relations should be  targeted on the regionai economy and the need to  promote~- ...  ·: 
interdepend~nce, as has not always been the· case.  The provision of EC and bilateral assistance (with 
.the  exceptio~!. of assistance for -humanitarian  purposes, democratisation· and  human ·rlghts)·to the region 
•  and·to individual countries should take into account the readiness of the countries to co-operate with each 
other  e.g~  by the :possible establishment' of. .mutual  trade  preferences or free .trade  areas and customs 
n  .  'fhis will not apply for arn;mgements for wine which would still be glob·al in nature, applying to -Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  FRY  would, obviously, only receive its "share" of the general 
preferences once it met the eligibility criteria for the trade preferences.  ·  · 
14  For which a WTO-waiver will be requested 
6 unions15•  Co-operation between states should also,  increasingly, be a prerequisite for the establishment 
of closer  links  with  the  EU,  and· for assistance.  A  percentage  of assistance  under  multi-beneficiary 
programmes  could  be  reserved  for  multi-country  or  cross-border  political  or  e:conomic  co-operation 
initiatives (with other countries of the region, with neighbouring candidate countries and with EU  Member 
States).  The  focus  could  be.  on  the  development of exchanges,  the  creation  of common  projects  and 
'  •  •  I  t 
institutions, and 'the building and further development of regional strengths.  .  .  · 
·.  '  .  ' 
On  a macroeconomic.level, the Commission,  in  co-operation with  the  International  Financial  Institutions • · 
(IFis), will continue to monitor closely macro-economic developments.  As well as grant-based assistance,  · 
the Corr)mission,  as in  the past, will  consider,  on  an  exceptional basis,  balance of payments support for 
those  countries  of the  region  (and  adjacent  countries)  which  are  eligible for  such  support.  Bilateral 
assistance  could  also  include ·debt  relief,  or  cancellation,  especially  for  the  countries  that  have  been 
particularly hard-hit. by ·recent costly and  destabilising developments. ·  The  Commission  and  the  World 
Bank  have. created  a  coordination  mechanism  to  ensure  that  the  regional  dimension  of  Kosovo 
recon~truction  .. is  fully  taken  into  account,  and  will  coord'inate  donor  mobilisation,  economic .analysis. 
conditibns of support and implementation' on the spot. 
Political dialogue 
.  .  . 
As indicated above, the Stabilisation and  Associati~n Agreements will include the development of political 
dialogue on a multilaterar'/ regional .level.  Attention must also be paid to this issue, in the framework of the 
Stabilisation and  Association process,. for those countries that are not yet eligible  for such  Agreements. 
This should  be  in  addition to bilateral political dialogue.  Such  dialogue should. be developed at various 
l~vels (from official to ministerial) and in various formats (Presidency I Commission or the new Troika), and 
should whenever possible be  held in a regional/ sub-regional format, thereby also providing opportunities· 
for. the- oountries to meet to discuss ·issues of common and  regional interest.  Political DeClarations, ·as in 
June 1998 for Bosnia and Herzegqvina, equid also be envisaged, as well as  the creation of mechanisms 
for technical discussior~s. as in the EU I BiH Consultative Task Force.  · 
4.  General Conclusions 
The EU, on the basis of its  experience 'to  date of the  Regional  Approach,  is- ready  for a  long-term  ~nd 
substantial commitment to  the stabilisation of the region.  This stabilisation effort will,  in  the  firSt  place. 
focus on the. five countries, while also having. a broader regional approach covering the wider region. The 
Regional  Approach,  its  scope,  instruments  and  conditionality,  remain  basically valid. ·In  the  light of the 
forthcoming .EU  Common  Strategy towards  the  region,  as  well  as  the  proposal  for a Stability Pact for 
South-Eastern Europe, and most particularly the changed circumstances in the region, it should, however, 
. be substantially developed  .  .For this reason, the Commission !las proposed the creation of a Stabilisation  · . 
·and Association process, the  main  feature of which  will  be  the  offer to  the  five  countries - in  return for  · 
compliance  with  the  relevant  conditions  - of a  new  kind  of contractual· relations: ·Stabilisation  and· 
Association Agreements. · .Other elementswould  include  incre~sed and  reoriented  assistance,  increased 
support for democratisation, development of trade and political dialogu~. and cooperation in new fields. 
'  .  -
While  dev~loping policies. towards the region,  and- particularly in  reiation  to  the  post-conflict  situati~n in 
Kosovo,  the  articulation  of the_  relationship  between  these  policies  towards  the  region  - the  existing 
Regional Approach  and  future Common  Strategy,  as  welL as  the  proposed  Stability Pact - and  those  of 
other actors (UN,  Coundl of Europe, OSCE, WEU and  NATO, relevant international financial institutions) 
··  . needs to be considered carefully. · 
If this strategy is  to be  successful, the peoples and  governmer:~ts of the region  must: also participate arid 
make deiterm!ned efforts .e.g. the pursuit of WTO accession, the possible development of free trade areas 
between themselves and within the region,  and with increased  regional  cooperation on a bilateral and  a 
~  .  .  .  . 
15  While avoiding the creation of RS I FRY.and FBiH I Croatia structures to the detriment of BiH as a whole  · 
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multilateral level, as well as respect for the conditionality set out in  the  existing  Regional Approach.  The 
Regional Approach, and. indeed any set of policies adopted-by the  EU  or the  international  community in  · 
general, can only do so·much.  The future of the region lies in the hands of its peoples and governments:· 
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~I Country Specific Conclusions . 
·The Commission will  continue to prepare regular reports on--compliance  by the countries concerned with 
· the  conditionality  of the  Stabilisation  and  AssoCiation  process,  the  next  report  on  which  will  be  in 
November 1999.  As. regards the totality of bilateral  relations with  the  countries of the  Stabilisation  and 
Association  process,  the  Commission would,  at present,  draw the following  op~rational conclusions 
16  in 
-·resp~ct of the individual countries:.  · 
Bosnia ana Herzegovina. 
Negotiations  on  a  Stabilisation  and  AssoCiatio.n  Ag~eement with  Bosnia  and .  Herzegovina  will  be 
opened when it has met the relevant conditions. At the appropriate time, the Commission will prepare 
a technical  report on the feasibility of the  opening qf negotiations for such  an  agreement.  In  the 
contextof bilateral relations with  BiH,.and thfduture opening of negotiations. political and  ecor1Qmic 
dialogue  might  be  Intensified.  ·The  Consultative  Task  Force  could  also  play  an  important role. 
Opportunities·  to enhance co-operation in  specific areas should  be  considered,  and  communication 
and dialogue should be promot19d, including at a regional level.  · 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  should  continue,  at this  time,  to  benefit  from  the  autono~ous ~rade 
preferences  extended  by · the  European  Community  and  will  continue  to. benefit  from PHARE 
assistance related 'to reconstruction  and  institution-building needs, as well as in support of the peace 
agreements, although it will  only benefit from  full  "traditional"  PHARE once the  relevant conditions 
have been met by the authorities, at State··and Entity level.  l.t  is hoped that sufficient progress might 
be made by the end of the next  reporting period, in November 1999.  ·  ·  ·  · 
Croatia 
Negotiations with Croatia on  a Stabilisation and ~ssociation Agreement will  be  opened  when  it 
h.as  met the relevant conditions.  At the  appropriate time, the  Commission  will  prepare a technical 
report  on· .the  feasibility  of the  opening  of negotiations  for such  an  agreement.  In  the· context of 
bilateral. relations,  and  the future  opening  of negotiations, communication  and  exchanges of views 
might be intensified, including in a more structured framework e.g.  politiCal dialogue and a technical 
consultative task force.  ·  )  _  · 
Croatia should continue, at this time,  to,bemifit from theautonomous trade preferences extended 
by the European Community.  In  order to  lift the  suspension ofPHARE, further progress towards 
democracy will be necessary, inter alia,  in. the fields of media reform,  electoral reform,  and  refugee 
return,  in accordance with the 29 April  1997 conditions.  It is hoped that progress on these might be 
made by the end of the next reporting period, in  November 1999. The EC has, nonetheless. already 
·- given  assistance  in  other fields  (humanitarian,  support  for democratisation  including  independent 
media, and refugee-return related reconstruction) and will continue to  do so.  Additional assistance 
will  be  targeted  on  areas  relevant  to  the  development  of democracy,  economic  regeneration  of' 
· refugee return areas and education (including e.g. Tempus and European Training .Foundation). 
.  . ..  ,,  .  .  .  '  .  .  .  . .  ', 
Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia 
In the light of the continuing conflict in Kosovo and the obvious non-fulfilment of relevant-conditions. it  · 
is  not appropriate  to discuss  the  eligibility  of the  FRY for the autonomous  ~rade preferences or 
PHARE, or the.  opening of negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The FRY 
will be eligible for such instruments once the relevant conditions are fulfilled.  In the interim, the FRY 
16  Based on the general assessment of developments in each of the countries (contained in Annex 2 of the present 
Communication) as well as the more detailed factual report o·n compliance, since October 1998, with Regional Approach  . 
conditionality (contained In the Commission Staff Working Paper on that subject: SEC(99)714 of  17.5.99) 
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will continue. to receive humanitarian and  democratisation assistance and to benefit from  OBNOVA I 
Reconstruction assistance (which is, in ·the main, geographically limited to Kosovo and  Montenegro - · 
assistance to Serbia is.limited to support forthe independent media), with  particular emphasis on the  . 
. return of refugees I internally displaced persons.  ·  · 
, As a result of  the continuing conflict in  Kosovo, existing measures against the FRY I Serbia are to be 
· strengthened  in  line  with  the  Council  Conclusions  of 26  April :1999,  which  also  decided  on  an  oil 
embargo.  These include an arms embargo; a visa ban.(already extended to cover those responsible 
for  the  suppression  of independent  media)  a  supply  ban  on  equipment  which  could  be  used  for 
terrorism or police repression;  a. moratorium on  export· credit; a. freeze on  Serbian l FRY Government 
funds held abroad; a prohibition on  new investment; a flight-ban on  FRY-registered airlines. The main 
. forms of bilateral relations with  the  European Community apply to the  state (FRY)  C!S  a whole ...  As 
1
.  these instruments cannot therefore be  used for, the benefit ofMontenegro, continuing assistance to 
...  that.republic will  be  by  means· of other Community' instruments.  Budgetary  assistance  for· costs 
related to internally displaced persons from Kosovo is being provided. 
For~er  Yugoslav R_epubllc of Macedonia 
.  . 
Due  to  the  positive  record  achieved· so far,  as  well  as  the  country's  compliance  with  the  relevant 
conditions, and in  accordance with the  Conclusions of the General Affairs Council-on 8 and  ~6 April 
· 1999, the  Commission  will  present  a  report  on. the  feasibility  of the  opening  of negotiations  for, a 
·Stabilisation-and Association Agreement  with this country.  Taking into account discussions in the 
Council, the Commission could make recommendations for negotiating directives.  In the interim, .the 
·Cooperation· Agreement  and  the  Agreement' in  the  Field  of  Transport  will  continue  to  be 
·implemented,  and· relations  will  intensify  in  that  framework  and  in  the· framework  of the  Political 
Dialogue, with modification of the terms of reference of the working party on customs and  taxation to 
cover statistical :matters, as a follow up to the March 1999 Cooperation Council. 
The country will continue to benefit from Community assistance, notably in the framework ofPHARE. 
The eligibility of the former Yugoslav Republic:; of Macedonia for additional  PHARE multi-beneficiary 
programmes will be determined  or:~ a case-by-case basis,  taking  into account their consistence with  , 
and value-added to the National Programme. Budgetary assistance for refugee-related expenses wjll 
·also be provided.  1- ·  ·  · 
Albania · 
In acc6rdance with the Conclusions of the General Affairs Counc:;il on 26 April 1999, the Commission 
is prepared to report in due course on the feasibility of the opening of negotiations for a  Stabilisation 
. and Association Agreement with· Albania.  Taking  into· account discussions in  the  Council,  . the 
• Commission  could  make recommendations for negotiating directives.- In  the  interim, contractual 
relations  with  the  Community,  based  on  the  1992  Cooperation  Agreement  and · the  connected 
Declaration on  Political  Dialogue,  will  be  continued,  and  new working parties (on  infrastructure and 
agriculture) established.  A formal  proposal for a bilateral trade regime.  In  accordance with General 
Affairs Council conclusions of 9 November  199~ will be  presented shortly, with  a view to  upgrading 
!he bilateral tr~de regime towards regional standards: 
PHARE and other Community assistance will be  continued with a view to achieving further progress 
in stabilisation, recovery, economic reform and democratisation in.this country as  ~ell as to enhancing 
· regional co-operation.  ·The EU will continue, in particular, to support the re.:.establishment of a viable 
Albanian  police  in  co-operation  with ·the  streng~hened WEU  Mission  and,  to  enhance  its  Customs 
Assistance Mission, on the basis of the amended Customs Code.  ·Budgetary assistance.for refugee-
. related  expenses  is  being  provided ..  Balance  of _payment  support  adopted  recently  will  be 
.implemented  without  delay,· and .. macro-economic developments  will  be  monitored  closely  by  the 
Commission a.nd the IFis. ·  · 
I'o 
'.' Annex 1 
Overall EC Assistance to Kosovo's neighbouring countries 1991-99  (Mio €)  <'t> 
.  ·  :  .  (Commitments)  '  .  ·  ·  · 
ALBANIA(2)  BOSNIA(3)  ·cROATIA  FRY  FYROM  MULTI· 
COUNTRY 
. 
TYPE OF EC ASSISTANCE 
'  . 
, PHARE + OBNOVA  616.4  754.5  49.6  41.7  236.7  9.8 
HUMANITARIAN AID 
. (ECHO)  41.2 
(  1032.1  .  290.8  . 262.8  45.7  .  .. 236.1 
FOOD SECURITY·  ... 
(DGVIll}  16.5  - '  - - - . -
BALANCE OF PAYMENT 
SUPPORT·(DG D)  .  20.0  .60.0  - - 40.0  -
.EIB  46.0  - - - - -
.. 
OTHER ACTIONS (4)  .  122.8  221.2  . 9;3  17.5  2.0  12.3 
TOTAL EC ASSISTANCE  .  862.9'  2067.8  349.7  322.0  324.4  258.2 
Member States assistance  712.8  507.9  1165.9  712.4  178.2  -
{f990-97)  ' 
GRAND TOTAL  1575.7  2575.7  1515.6  1034.4  502.5  258.2 
EBRD  68.0  '  70.0.  511.0  143.0 
(I) As of  end-April 1999, except for EIB and EBRD figures which include assistance from  I 99  I to I  998, and Member States' assistance which covers 1990-1997 
(2) Grant macro-financial assistances to Albania decided in  1992 an_d  1994 are included in Phare financing. 
(3) Out of  the 60 Meuros of  balance of  payment support, the 15 Meuros grant programmed for 1.999 will be financed by Obnova. 
The total amount under Phare+Obnova line has thus been reduced by I 5 to avoid double-counting. 
(41 Other actions mainly include food aid to Albania provided by FEOGA (12fJ Meuros) and demining and other actions in Bosnia (200 Meuros). 
n.a. =not available  ·  · 
II 
TOTAL 
1708.6 
1908.7 
16.5 
I 
I 
' .120.0 
46.0 
385.1 
4184.9 . 
3277.2  ·' 
7462.1 
I 
792.0 - ~-:  ~ ~  --~~  ~--··  -~---~----- --;-:-;_,;;  ~~-.-~--.7 ,?:-'_--
.. 
::1.  · · ·OyeraU ECC~ssistan~e to Kosovo's. neighbouring countries in 1999  t(Mio €)  (I>'. 
!  I  •  ·  ·  ·  {Commitments) 
~ 
.!  ALBANIA  BOSNIA  CROATIA  FRY  FYROM  MULTI-COUNTRY  TOTAL  ·.  i  I  I 
TYPE OF ECASSISTANCE  ..  ,· 
-
PHARE + OBI";OV  A  us,~- 146,0  1~,0  23,5  68,7  2,8  '  374,5  '  ... 
'~- ' 
HUMANIT~·AID  _:. 
"  .. 
'· 
..  .  . 
I  - . 
.• 
(ECHO)  '7,0 .  564. 
.  '  ·  5,o· .·  -7,6.  - 182,0  . 258,0 
FOOD SE.CURITY  ~  .. 
\ 
(DGVIII)  ··.: ,  __ :;  - 5,7  - - - .  . - - 5,7  - . 
B~ANCE.OF  PAYMENT  .. 
SUPPORT (DG II)  · 
'  ~o,o  \  60,0 .  . - ...  - - - 80,0 . 
.  .  ,. 
EIB  ..  n.a.  n.a.  - - - - 0,0 
"  ..  ..  ·- .. 
OTHER ACTIONS 
..  1Q,O  1,4  0,5  0,5  2,0  14,4 
'  : 
TOTAL EC ASSISTANCE  . .  ,~ .  .  151,2  27~,4  21,4  31,~  69 2. 
..  '  186,8'  732,6. 
(I) Indicative all~anons. 
n.a.,;, n'ot available':;.  r 
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-12" Annex 2 
in 
· ·The degree of political progress in each country, as described in the following paragraphs, has 
been influenced by its willingness to put the development of relations with the EU but also with 
its  neighbours in  the  region above  national(ist) interests.  As  is  evident,  certain _countries,  in 
certain fields,  have not yet demonstrated a commitment to the European future to which they 
lay  claim.  This. commitment  demands  respect  for  democratic  principles  and  the. ideal  of 
. cooperation between states. Progress, particularly in respect of the objectives of the· Regional 
Approach has been patchy, depending on  the willingness of the· countries concerned  .. to make 
· the necessary efforts.  For example,  the  level  of democratization· has  increased in all  but 
Serbia,  although  respect  for  minority  rights.  differs  depending  on  the  national  context  .. 
lmplem~ntation of the  peace  agreements  has  been  p'atchy,  particularly  insofar  as  .refugee 
return  and  cooperation  with  the ·1cTY  is  conc~rned.  Some  progress  has  been :p1ade  in 
bilateral relations, but not in regional cooperation per se.  . 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a special· case in ttie Balkans. - it is in a triple transition process:  · 
. from the status of  federate republic of the .Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia· to  the 
status of independent republic; from a socialist econo·my to a market economy; from a civil war 
between three ethnic groups to a peace within a "single Republic made up of two  Entities~. At 
·the end of the '!Yar,  Bosnia-Her:zegovina (BiH) had lost 23% of its pre-war population: GOP and 
per capita income had dropped by three quarters, industrial production· by more than 9Q% and 
· more  than  1.2  million  of its  inhabitants  had fled  abroad,  around  750,000  to  EU ·countries  . 
.  Since 1996, reforms have  been  slow due to ·the  special political :structure of the country· and 
· the nationalist political formations which dominated the politiCal  scene until·the Ia sf  elections. 
The September 1998 elections indicated a first partial drift from the main nationalist. parties.· 
. The implementation of Dayton can be considered a success as far as its. military dimension is 
concerned.  On  the  civil  side,  much  progress  has  been  made  (handing  over 'of some  wat' 
,  criminals .to  the  Hague  Tribunal,  adoption  of common  symbols,  establishment  of common 
. institutions,  economic  reconstruction).  ·.  Nevertheless, ·the  return  of .minority  refugees.  the 
·.  functioning of the .common institutions and .judicial reform are not completely ,satisfactor)'.  On 
the other· hand, in ·the period 1996-1998, ·real growth of the economy has been of the otder of, 
an.average 40% ·per year at State level, although :the political obstruction to ·the·peace process 
by the  RS  led .this  entity to  two years ·of _economic  stagnation,  until the C!PPOintment  of PM  · 
Dodik (beginning 1998). The rapid -improveJTient was from ·a  ve,Y low base, and income levefs 
and  the  provision of social  services are  among the: lowest in. ·Europe.  The  mai~ pr9blem  of 
~Bosnia-HerZegovina has been the lack of  consolidated statehood.  This is  due t6 th.e  attitude·. 
·of BiH  leaders, who still do  r:~ot fully  r~ly 'on  cooperation within· the  common· ins.titutions,  buL 
also 'to  ~he complexity of the institution~! framework:  · In  early  1999,  there were. signs  of 
,improvement in  certain  policy areas.  especially privatizatipri,  irwestment legis!ation,  customs 
legislation  and  the  financial  sector.  Some important steps.' forward  continue  to  be·  made  in 
market economy reform although more efforts for proper implementation are  ~till needed.  The 
main  risk  r~mait:~s  poverty  and  social, disruption,  especially· in. the· RS.  ·  C.oncerriing 
.~democratization and respect for human rights, there t)as beeb some progress in  c~rta!n fields, 
but recent political developments in the RS. and in ~Kosovo have hamJ)ered,  for the time being, 
further qualitative general improvement.  Progress is  still  needed in  cooperation  between  the 
different ethnic groups, although some positive developments occurred, particularly in the field 
of party  politics.  Co-operation  from  some  local  authorities· in  the  RS  has,  very  recently, 
improved.  Interesting  progress· also  occurred  in  the media  and  further  improvement  is 
expected  in  forthcoming  months. Regional  cooperation  co~tiriues at varying  levels,  but  the 
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undue  influence of Zagreb  and  Belgrade  remains  quite  strong.  The  implementation  of the 
Dayton I Paris Agreements is progressing slowly, for different reasons. 
Croa~tia  has  demonstrated  its  readiness  to  make ~some efforts .  with  a  vieyv  .to  post-war  . 
. stabilization and  normalization.  It has shown  its openness to  enhanced cooperation with  the 
-fnternational Community.  Integration in  European and  Euro-Atlantic structures is  a priority in 
Croatian  politics.  There  were  some  achievements  with  regard  to the acceptance  of the 
relevant international ar~d national legal frameworks for the respect of the rule of law. Progress 
has occurred in civil  society, with  an  interesting evolution of popular·.opinion from  nationalistic 
considerations.  _upon  which  Croatian  political  life  was  founded,  to  a  more  mature  pluralistic  -
system. ·  The  development of the  Croatian  economy  proceeded  well  until  1998  when  the 
consequences  of- the  failure  to  introduce  structural  reforms  began  to  show.  ·.  Significal}t 
improvements  have  occurred  in  regional  cooperation  as  well  as  in  the  formal· integration  of· 
Eastern Slavonia. The delicate issue of the return of refugees has req!Jired strong international 
pressure,  and  serious  difficulties  remain  in  the  implementation  of  Croatia's  commitments. 
Nevertheless, the large gap remaining between formal commitments and their implementation  -
prevents  Croatia  from  reaching  the  required  standards  of democratization.  Despite  the 
· declared  intentions of the  Government,  the  overall  scenario seems  to  have  stalled  in  recent 
months.  In  fact, -prc;>gress  since  October  1998  in  compliance  with  the  different  sets  of · 
conditions·  is  still  selective.  Real  implementation  of  international  -commitments·  is  still 
unsucc;_essful,  despite  continuing  international  insistence.  Democratization  and  respect  for 
human  rights· remain  the  main  areas  of concern,  t:JOtably  with  reference  to  reform  of  the 
electoral  law  and  democratization  of  media,  where  no  progress  can  be  reported.  Further 
. substantial  progress  is  also  expected  as  far  as  respect  for  minorities  and  their  rights  is 
concerned. Cooperation with neighbouring countries-has continued  in a rather satisfactory way-
and  Croatia  ha~  _proved. willing  to  resolve  t~e outstanding  questions  by  diplomatic  means. 
Problems  remain,  however;  as  regard  relations  with  the  Federation  of .  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina.  Despite  rather  good  resuits  in  the  past  and  a  satisfactory  legal  framework, 
concern  is  rising  regarding  the . increasingly  worsening· economic  situation.  As  far  as 
compliance with  Dayton- and  Erdut ·obligations is  concenied; positive steps have occurred  in 
. refugee return, although the  process is still rather slow.  Normalization 'of war-damaged areas 
.  continues. although further effectiye efforts are  still required,  notably in  the ·implementation of 
the Programme for the Reestablishment of Trust. 
.  .  . 
Within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ·the picture is mixed, with contrasting d~velopments 
in  Serbi~ and.  Montenegro.  _  There_  has  been  no  progress  in· democratisation  or  reform  in 
Serbia I  Fed~ral Republic· of Yugoslavia (FRY).  The ·suppression· of the  rights  of the  -
populatio_n ·since 1989 in Kosovo has finally erupted into open conflict which has had 'effects in-· 
neighbouring states..  In general, there has been  a contradiction  in  FRY I Serbia between the 
theoretical  respect for  democratic  principles,  as  enshrined ~~in- the  .Constitution,. laws.  and 
. obligations arising  fro~ signature  of various  international  tre.aties  and  con_ventions: and  th_e  · 
practical implementation of these principles.  Even  before the  recent declaration of a State of 
War, there. was a ciear and continuing lack of respect for democratic principles, ·particularly. for 
. media  and  academic freeooms,  as well as  administrative and judicial proceedings. While  the 
Constitution a!")d_laws of the FRY and Serbia provide for extensive human and minority rights, 
different 171inority groupings - the Kosovar Albanians,  the Croat and  Hungarian minorities, and 
the  Sandzak Muslims -~ have experienced .varying degrees of' difficulty in  the  respect for  an~ 
implementation of these laws,  the· most giaring,example of which  has  been ·recent events  in 
. Kosovo.  !nter  alia,  the  Gonzalez  recommendations .remain  unimplemented,  and  with  the 
·declaration  of a  State  ofWar in  March  1999.and  the  acceleration  of massive ·deportations 
accompanied  by  unspeakable  atrocities,  even  ·the  trappings  of  democracy  are  "now 
disregarded. Kosovo is now completely lawless.  Economic reforms have  b~en sporadic, with 
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reduction of wartime hyperinflation being progressively undone by looser monetary· and  fiscal . 
policies  in  advance  of .the  1997  elections  and  subsequent  pressure  on  scarce  financial 
resources due to growing external and fiscal deficits, accelerating  inflation in  late  1998 and a 
continuing  failure  to  privatise.  In  the  last  year,  policy  on  Kosovo  has- had  .·serious 
consequences for the economy, both in terms of the cost of the war and, now, NATO airstrikes 
on the military-industrial base arid physical infrastructure. Prior to the escalation of the Kosovo 
crisis  which  has ·led  to  a deterioration  in· relations  with· neighbours  and  the  breaking  off of 
diplomatic relations with  ce_rtain  other states,  FRY had  made  some  progress  in  regional. co-
operation, most notably as regards the normalisation of its relations with Croatia, but the issue 
of SFRY  succession,  and  the  division of  SFRY debts and  assets  remains  unresolved,  with 
implications  for  FRY  participation  in  international  organisations. and  fora.  In  contrast. 
·developments in  Montenegro have been  more p_ositive.  The  replacement,  after fre~ and  fair 
elections, of the  pro-Milosevic regime of Bulatovic by a coalition  led  by  President Djukanovic 
has  resulted  in  a  positive  impulsion  towards  reform  and. democratisation,  supported  by  the 
European Union.  This has led  to a  mar~ed exacerbation of difficulties in  relations.  in almost 
all  fields  and .  at  all  levels,  between  Belgrade  an~ . Podgorica,  but· has  continued  despite 
incr~asing pressure· and  threats  fro~ the  _federal  level,  and  the  presence  of considerable 
numbers of refugees and  displaced persons.  Economic reform is taking place, though slowly. 
notably regarding privatisation. Montenegro was given a specific·exemption, in January. from 
the existing ban on flights to the EC by  FRY~registered carriers.· 
During  the  last  three  years,  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of Macedonia has  been  a 
stabilizing factor in the region.  The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has confirmed its 
political  maturity  and  its  commitment. to -democratic  principles,  with  a  smooth  and  peaceful  . 
political  transition  taking  place,  after  free  and  fair  elections.  Since  the  new  Government _  _. 
arrived, ·some  substantial  measwes  have  been  taken  to  reinforc~  the  respect  for  and 
protection  of minorities,  in  particular  the  Albanian  minority,  the  symbol  of which  was  the 
release of the Tetovo and Gostivar Mayors. But even before that, political parties representing 
the interests of the Albanian minority have always been in the Government. · The country has 
proven its ·commitment to regionaL cooperation.  Its determination to  have. good relations and 
· to  resolve  pending  issues  with  neighbours  resulted  recently  in  the  signing  of  the  Joint  . 
Declaration with  Bulgaria that solved the language issue between  the  two countries.  Beyond · 
political relations,. the country has also developed important economic and trade relations with 
the· countries of the ·region (Agreements with Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and  Herzegovina and 
FRY  have  been. signed).  The country;s cooperation  with  the  international  community  in 
seeking  a  peaceful  solution,to the  Kosovo  crisis  was  enhanced,  with  its  acceptance of the· 
deployment of NATO troops· a~ well  as refugees from  Kosovo. Human rights. and rule of law· 
are· protected by a comprehensive set of legal protections  •. even if mer~ attention may be paid  . · 
to.  freedom  of expression.  · . ·Between  1996  and  1999; · the  economic  reforms  and  the  · 
stabilization  policy pursued  by the· Governments in  line with  IMF. recommendations enabled 
the  country ·to  achieve  macroeconomic  stability,  though  since  the  end  of  .1998  the  IMF 
programme has been off-track because the  second  tr?~nche of the  three-year loan under the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) was linked to the privatisation of twelve large 
industrial  conglomerates,  on  which  no  agreement  has  yet been  reached.  The  inflation  and 
budgetary situations have  been. kept  under control.  Unemployment,  however,  has  remained 
high· since  1996.  Market  economy  reform ·is  ongoing,  with  the  reform .of  the  legal  and 
regulatory  framework!  the  privatization  process  and  the  reform  of the  banking  sector  still 
deserving particular attention.  .  The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, therefore, has 
not only respected· the principles of the EU's regional approach, but has played an exemplary 
role throughout the three last years that was instrumental in achieving the objectives of this EU 
policy.  ·  ·  · 
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The 1996 crisis· in Albania,· provoked by tne breakdown of the pyramid schemes in  late 1996 
and  previous  irregularities  during  parliamentary  elections  in  May  1996-was  contained  by  a 
coorc;jinated  international  response.A government of national  reconciliation  was  established, 
followed  by  general  elections  in  June/July  1997  and  the  temporary -deployment  of  a 
internationalprotection-force. A new government under PM Nand (July 1997 to October 1998) 
was able to achieve notable macro-economic stabilization and· the first steps were taken in the 
winding  up  of the  pyramid  schemes  and  in  public  administration reform.  Albania  continued 
however tQ  suffer from a -lack of public order and widespread crime and  corruption as a result 
of this and from the continuous boycott of Parliament by the  Democratic Party. While freedom 
of- expression·_ and  other  basic- rights  were  ensured,  Albania  remained  confronted  with 
-structural· problems which  pre-dat~ the  crisis (poor infrastructure; weak .state institutions).  The 
- fragility of the c_ountry was highlighted on  several occasions, inter alia by the renewed  riots in 
September  1998.  The  new government of PM  Majka  (since  October .1998)  shows  a  more 
serious commitment to face the structural problems of the country but is obviously confronted 
with  the  prevailing' traditions  in  the  ~I  ban ian. society.- The  adoption  of a  constitution  in 
November 1998 was a milestone -for democracy and the rule. of law.  Buftangible results in law 
enforcem-ent  ·presuppose·  an  effective  strengthening  of  both  the  security  forces  and- the 
judiciary. Talks outside Parliament with the Democratic Party have somewhat reduced politiCal 
confrontation but normality seems still not within reach. Macro~economic stabilization has been 
_  qonfirmed but remains vulnerable in the light of the refugee problem and the  continuih~rlack of 
public order yvhile  structural economic· reforms {privatization,  financial  sector) still need  to be 
tackled._  All  Albanian  governments  have  pursued  a  moderate  policy  of self-restraint  with 
respect to the situation of ethnic Albanians in  neighbouring countries:_ The traditional low level· 
·of regional  cooperation  d!d _  not  ctiange  with  the  exception  of an  increased  economic- and 
technical cooperation with the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedoriia. 
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